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The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials
Under Section 501 of the LMRDAt
R. Theodore Clark, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted legislation dealing in a comprehensive

manner with internal union affairs for the first time when it
passed' the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (LMRDA) .2 Impetus for its passage was, to a very important extent, provided by the McClellan Committee's exposures
of union abuses and malpractices.3 One of the Committee's overall findings was that union funds in excess of ten million dollars
were either stolen, embezzled, or misused over a period of fifteen
years by officials of the five unions investigated. 4 It is not too
surprising, therefore, that provisions imposing fiduciary duties
upon union officials were included in section 501 of the Act.5
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Russell
A. Smith of the University of Michigan Law School for his assistance
and advice in the preparation of this Article.
*Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. For an informative account of the legislative evolution of the
LMEDA, see Levitan & Loewenberg, The Politics and Provisions of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, in REGULATING UNION GOVERNIENT 29 (M.S.
Estey, P. Taft, & M. Wagner ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as REGULATING
See also A.K. McAumws, PowER AND POLITICS IN
UNION GOVERNMTENT].
LABOR LEGISLATION (1964).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
3. "Beneath the legislative history of the LIMRDA... are the reports of the McClellan Committee, which provided the impetus for the
LMRDA." Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 248 (D. Minn.), affd,
325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). See generally Interim Report of the Select
Comm. on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, S.
REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
4. S. REP. No. 1417, supra note 3, at 1.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1964). This section provides, in relevant part:
(a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group. It is,
therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account the
special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold
its money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the
same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any
resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party
or in behalf of an adverse party in.any matter connected with
his duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the
organization. A general exculpatory provision in the constitu-
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Although sections 501(a) and (b) will be thoroughly discussed, it is advisable initially to summarize their provisions.
Section 501(a) declares that union officials occupy positions of
trust with respect to their unions. Taking into account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, that provision
imposes a fiduciary duty on union officials in three specific instances. First, union officials are required to hold the union's
assets solely for the benefit of the union and to invest, manage,
and expend them in conformity with the union's constitution and
bylaws and any resolutions passed thereunder. Second, such
officials are required to refrain from dealing adversely with
their union and from acquiring any interests of a pecuniary or
personal nature which conflict with the interests of the union.
Third, union officials are required to account for any profits received in connection with transactions conducted by them for
the union. The last sentence of subsection (a) voids all exculpatory provisions in any union constitution, bylaw, or resolution
which attempt to relieve union officials of the fiduciary duties
imposed by the statute.
Section 501(b) provides for suits by union members to enforce the duties set out in subsection (a). Procedurally, the
member must first request his union to sue. If the union refuses
or fails to sue, the member may the:a bring suit after obtaining
leave of a court "for good cause shown." Section 501(b) further
provides that the court "may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action ... to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting
tion and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve
any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by
this section shall be void as against public policy.
(b) When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative
of any labor organization is alleged to have violated the duties
declared in subsection (a) of this section and the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to
sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other
appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organization,
such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or
representative in any district court of the United States or in
any State court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or
secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit
of the labor organization. No such proceeding shall be brought
except upon leave of the court obtained upon verified application and for good cause shown, which application may be made
ex parte. The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of the
recovery inany action under this subsection to pay the fees of
counsel prosecuting the suit at the instance of the member of
the labor organization and to comoensate such member for
any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection with the litigation.
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SECTION 501
...6

Although the provisions of section 501 may seem clear at first
blush, they contain a number of serious ambiguities. It is the
purpose of this Article to discuss and attempt to resolve these
ambiguities.
II.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE FIDUCIARY
DUTIES IMPOSED BY SECTION 501(a)

A.

UNION OFFIcIALs CovERED

Section 501 (a) of the LMRDA imposes fiduciary duties upon
"officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives" of
unions. Section 3 (q) of the Act 7 defines the phrase "officers,
agents, shop stewards, and other representatives" broadly to include not only the constitutional officers of a union, "but also
anyone, regardless of title, or lack thereof, who performs duties
commonly performed by constitutional officers or any member
of an 'executive board' of a union."'8 Undoubtedly, this broad
definition is the main reason why there has not yet been any
serious litigation on this point.9
6. Although this Article deals only with the civil aspects of the
union official's fiduciary obligations under § 501, it should be noted that
§ 501(c) sets forth criminal sanctions against any union officer or employee "who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or
converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds,

I
securities, property, or other assets of a labor organization ....
Duker, Fiduciary Responsibility of Union Officials, in SmwPosium ON
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLosuRE ACT OF 1959, at
519, 526-27 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as SYmPoSium];
see generally Wollett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13
N.Y.U. AN. C.ONF__0X .BOR 267, 272-73 (1960).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 3(q) (1964). See generally Rezler, The Definitions
of LMRDA, in SymPosim 263, 268-69.
8. Duker, supra note 6, at 519. Duker noted that § 3(q)'s
meticulous recital of all possible categories of persons in power
in unions... [was] motivated largely by the decision in NLRB
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, Inc. [340 U.S. 264
(1956) ], wherein it was held that the term 'officers' means 'constitutional officers,' that is, persons referred to in the union
constitution as officers.
Id. at 519-20. See 105 CoNG. REC. 10,103 (1959) (remarks of Senator
Goldwater), DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLosuRE ACT OF 1959, TITLES I-IV 223
(1964) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HsT.].
9. In Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 84, 89
(E.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967), the court observed that the statute
did not furnish a jurisdictional ground for actions against labor organizations and employers. See also Local 92, Iron Workers v. Norris,
66 L.R.R.M. 2297 (5th Cir. 1967) (local union not an indispensable

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 52:437

THE BREADTH OF THE FmuciARY DUTIEs

There has been considerable discussion and disagreement
about the breadth of the fiduciary obligations imposed upon
union officials by section 501(a).10 The first sentence of the section declares, seemingly without qualification, that certain designated union officials occupy positions of trust, whereas the
second sentence imposes only three specific obligations upon
union officials." The question posed, therefore, is whether the
broadly stated fiduciary duty imposed by the first sentence of
section 501 (a) is limited and qualified by the three specific obligations of the second sentence. Since these specific obligations
deal almost exclusively with fiscal. wrongdoing, the question
may alternatively be stated as whether the fiduciary duties of
union officials under the Act extend only to fiscal matters.
The legislative history points toward a broader construction.
Section 501 of the LMRDA was taken in toto from the Elliott
bill, 12 the bill which was reported out by the House Committee
on Education and Labor. Since there is no indication in the
legislative history that any changes were intended by the House
when it included the fiduciary provision of the Elliott bill as
part of the Landrum-Griffin bill which was ultimately enacted,
the supplementary report accompanying the Elliott bill submitted by the author and four other representatives is extremely
relevant. As to whether the fiduciary duty of a union official
extends to nonfiscal matters, the supplementary report notes:
We affirm that the committee bill is broader and stronger
than the provisions of S. 1555 which relate to fiduciary responsibilities. S. 1555 applied the fiduciary principle to union officials only in their handling of "money or other property" (see
S. 1555, sec. 610), apparently leaving other questions to the
common law of the several States. Although the common law
covers the matter, we considered it important to write the
fiduciary principle explicitly into Federal labor legislation. Ac-

cordingly, the committee bill extends the fiduciary principle to
party); Robinson v. Weir, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1111,537 (D. Neb. 1965)
(surety properly joined in action against union official for breach of
his fiduciary duties). Cf. 105 CONG. REC. 16,489 (1959) (remarks of
Senator Goldwater), LEG. HIST. 1069.

10. See generally Soffer, Collective Bargainingand Federal Regulation of Union Government, in REGULATING UN oN GOVERNMET 91,
100-01; Wollett, supra note 6, at 267; Note, Counsel Fees for Union
Officers Under the Fiduciary Provision of Landrum-Griffin, 73 YALE
L.J. 443, 447-52 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Counsel Fees].
11. One court observed that § 501(a) "speaks broadly in one

breath and narrowly in the next." Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233,
240 (D.Minn.), affd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).

12. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1959).
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all the activities of union officials and other union agents or
representatives.'s
The conclusion that the fiduciary provision finally enacted into
law was intended by its authors to be given a broad construction
is further supported by the following excerpt from a speech by
Representative Elliott:
We wrote a comprehensive statement of the fiduciary duties of
union officers. The assets of a labor union belong to the members. Union office is a position of trust to be used for the benefit of the members. In collective bargaining, and in conducting
other business, union officers must put their fiduciary obligations ahead of their personal interest.' 4
Despite the relatively strong legislative history supporting a
broad construction, one commentator has taken the position that
"it was fiscal wrongdoing rather than administrative decisionmaking at which Congress aimed its sights.
...
-5 To support
this conclusion, the commentator declared that "Senator McClellan himself, in proposing the fiduciary provision, stated that its
aim would be to eliminate 'the serious misuses of funds, misappropriations of funds, looting of union treasuries, and so forth
... Y"16 An examination of the legislative history, however,
clearly shows that such reliance on the views of Senator McClellan is misplaced.
In the first place, the fiduciary provision which was finally
enacted into law was the one contained in the Elliott bill, not the
one proposed by Senator McClellan.' 7 Consequently, Senator
McClellan's comments concerning his fiduciary provision are
not relevant, while the comments of the sponsors of the Elliott
bill are. The latter clearly stated that the fiduciary provisions
in the Elliott bill were "broader and stronger than the provisions
of S. 1555 [Senator McClellan's provisions] which relate to fiduciary responsibilities," and that the duties extended "to all the
activities of union officials .... Is
13. t.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959) (emphasis
added). But see 105 CONG. Rsc. 14,346 (1959) (remarks of Representative Landrum), LEG. IhST. 1061.

14. 105 CONG. REC. 15,549 (1959), LEG. hIST. 1059-60.
15. Counsel Fees 450.
16. Id.
17. The fiduciary provision proposed by Senator McClellan and
adopted by the Senate as part of S. 1555 declared that any person
designated a union official "shall, with respect to any money or other
property in his custody or possession by virtue of his position as such
officer, agent, or representative, have a relationship of trust to any
such labor organization and the members thereof

.

Cong., 1st Sess. § 610 (1959).
18. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959).

S. 1555, 86th
S..."
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Further support for the position that section 501(a) applies
to nonfiscal as well as fiscal matters can be found in the language
of the statute itself.'
The second sentence of section 501 (a),
which supposedly refers only to fiscal wrongdoing, contains
language which has been interpreted as imposing fiduciary
duties of a nonfiscal nature. 20 A union official is prohibited
from dealing with the union "in behalf of an adverse party
in any matter connected with his duties .
*...
"21 Relying spe19.

Conversely, it may be argued that the fiduciary duties set

forth in § 501 (a) relate solely to fiscal wrongdoing inasmuch as the
provision for attorney's fees in § 501 (b) speaks in terms of a "recovery." See STAFF OF SENATE COi1M. cw LABoR AND PuBLIc WELFARE,
86Ta CONG., 2D SESS., SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 14 (Comm. Print
1959), LEG. HIsT. 846. See generally text accompanying notes 168-83
infra.
20. In addition, it is arguable that the broad statement of the
LMRDA's declaration of findings, purposes, and policy contained in
§ 2(b) supports the position that the fiduciary duties imposed by §
501(a) are not strictly monetary in nature. Section 2(b) reads as
follows:
The Congress further finds, from the recent investigations in
the labor and management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the
rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe
high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and supplementary legislation that will afford
necessary protection of the rights and interests of employees and
the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor
organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their
officers and representatives.
29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1964) (emphasis added). See Nelson v. Johnson,
212 F. Supp. 233, 247-48 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963);
Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations:
Unions, Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15
HASTINGS L.J. 391, 430 (1964).
However, a strong counter-argument can be made. The KennedyErvin bill which imposed no fiduciary duties upon union officials contained the same findings. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1959).
Senator Goldwater said that § 2 of the Kennedy-Ervin bill was
a mere pious gesture, having no legal. effect, providing no remedy for enforcement and designed to create the misleading
public impression that the bill effectively placed union officials
in the status of fiduciaries, a status which the public was demanding.
105 CONG. REC. 19,766 (1959), LEG. HIST. 1079. See Goldwater, The Legislative History and Purposes of the LMRDA, in SYvPosrum 32, 56-57.
21. One commentator observed that "this prohibition . . . extends
beyond money dealings; it can include collective bargaining dealings as
well." Duker, supra note 6, at 521. See Rosen, The Individual Worker
in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem, 24 AID.
L. REv. 233, 285 (1964); Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 HAIv. L. REV. 983, 1003 n.51 (1963);
see generally text accompanying notes 198-212 infra.
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cifically on this provision, the court in Schonfeld v. Rarback 22
held that section 501 (a) was not strictly limited to monetary
matters but extended to such matters as collusive collective bar23
gaining agreements.
A majority of the courts have construed section 501(a)
broadly. For instance, in Nelson v. Johnson,24 the court held
that the president and treasurer of a local union violated their
fiduciary duties when they refused to abide by a resolution
passed by the local membership directing the payment of the
attorney's fees and costs incurred by the plaintiffs in an action
under Title I of the LMRDA. While noting that section 501(a)
"speaks broadly in one breath and narrowly in the next,"25 the
court declared that it was "no parsimonious dole by Congress, to
'26
be in turn niggardly measured out by the Federal courts.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the fiduciary duties imposed upon union officials were "as broad as human experience
in the labor field."27 In affirming the decision, the Eighth Circuit stated that section 501(a) "imposes fiduciary responsibility
in its broadest application and is not confined in its scope to union
officials only in their handling of money and property affairs."2
The court in Moschetta v. Cross 29 held that the members of a
union's executive board violated their fiduciary obligations under section 501(a) when they refused to hold a special convention which had been previously authorized in accordance with
the union's constitution. In Parks v. IBEW,so the court declared
that "the broad declaration in the first sentence of section 501 (a)
22. 61 L.R.R.M. 2043 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Johnson v. Nelson,
325 F.2d 646, 649-50 (8th Cir. 1963).
23. The value of this decision as precedent is subject to question
inasmuch as the Second Circuit had previously held that § 501(a)
is applicable only "with respect to the money and property of the
union .... " Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964).
24. 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
25. 212 F. Supp. at 240.
26. Id. at 296.
27. Id. at 240.
28. Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646, 651 (8th Cir. 1963). Accord,
Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mo.
1965), alf'd on other grounds, 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 957 (1967). See Forline v. Local 42, Marble, Slate & Stone
Polishers, 211 F. Supp. 315, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Cf. -Iighway Truck
Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 284 F.2d 162
(3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
29. 48 L.R.R.M. 2669 (D.D.C. 1961). But see Jennings v. Carey,
57 L.R.R.M. 2635 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 58 L.R.R.M.
2606 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam).

30. 203 F Supp. 288 (D.Md. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 314
F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:437

.emphasizes the nature of the officers' duty, which is not
limited to pecuniary matters."31 In addition, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision that certain union
officers violated their fiduciary obligations under section 501
where "there was evidence to support the charge of abuse of
democratic processes in conducting the affairs of the union re*

.

lating to election of officers .... ,,2

33
On the other hand, the Second Circuit in Gurton v. Avrons
held that the fiduciary duties embodied in section 501 (a) did not
extend beyond the handling of the union's money or property.
The court said:
A simple reading of that section shows that it applies to fiduciary responsibility with respect to money or property of the
union and that it is not a catch-all provision under which union
officials can be sued on any ground of misconduct with which
the plaintiffs choose to charge them. If further corroboration
for this position be needed it will be found in the legislative
history and in the law review articles
cited by Judge Tenney in
34

his opinion in the district court.

The only legislative history cited by the district court related to
the debate on Senator McClellan's fid.uciary provision which was
subsequently passed by the Senate as part of S. 1555. 35 However,
it was the considerably broader fiduciary provision contained in
the Elliott bill rather than Senator McClellan's fiduciary provision which was finally enacted as part of the LMRDA. The reliance placed on this clearly inaccurate use of legislative history
by the district court casts doubt on the Second Circuit's holding
in Gurton.
31. 203 F. Supp. at 295-96.
32. Gilbert v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs Local 700, 237 Ore. 130,
134, 384 P.2d 136, 138 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964). But see
Schonfeld v. Caputo, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 19,078 (S.D.N.Y. 1964):
Titles I and IV of the Act are the exclusive provisions dealing
with the union member's right of franchise and redress for its
infringement.

If . . . this court lacks jurisdiction . . . [under

Titles I and IV] it does not acquire such jurisdiction under section 501 thereof.
Accord, Coleman v. Railway & S.S. Clerks, 228 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 340 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1965); Jennings v. Carey, 57 L.R.R.M. 2635
(D.D.C. 1964).
33. 239 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964), affg sub nom. Guarnaccia v. Kenin,
234 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Accord, Yanity v. Benware, 376
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1967); Coleman v. Railway & S.S. Clerks, 340 F.2d 206
(2d Cir. 1965); Charles v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 595
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Blassie v. Poole, 58 L.R.R.M. 2359 (E.D. Mo.
1965) (no violation of § 501 where international union imposed trusteeship over local union and dismissed officers without a hearing).
34. 339 F.2d at 375.
35. The district court stated: "Thus during the course of debate,
Senators McClellan and Ervin made it quite clear that the Section would
relate solely to matters of money and property." 234 F. Supp. at 442.
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C. T.HE "SPECIAL

SECTION 501
PROBLEMS AND FUNCTIONS" PROVISION

While section 501(a) imposes upon union officials a broad
fiduciary duty, it also provides that "the special problems and
functions of a labor organization" must be taken into account
in applying that duty.36 Enactment of this provision was particularly important to organized labor since it feared that any fiduciary obligations which might be imposed upon union officers
would not be interpreted to take into account the particular problems and purposes of modern unionism. 37 The following statement by George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, indicates the
nature and extent of the concern felt by organized labor:
The committee has approved provisions to which we take
vigorous exception.
Operating from a premise with which we certainly agree
and which we have consistently supported, that union office is
a sacred trust, the committee has proceeded to establish standards of fiduciary responsibility which could only lead to widespread confusion and the multiplicity of litigation.
There are certain obvious similarities between the obligation for safe, honest administration of funds and property entrusted to the care of a union officer or employee to those
obligations which bank or corporate officers owe their stockholders. The dissimilarities, however, are far more important,
and it is these which the committee has ignored.
The prime responsibility of the union officer is to advance
the interest and welfare of the members. The prime concern
of the banking official is to enhance the value of the property he
holds in trust.
A union does not exist for the purpose of making money.
It exists as a mechanism through which its members can combine to promote their mutual improvement, both as employees
and as members of society generally, and both materially and
in other ways.
One of our main objections is that the reach of this fiduciary concept as expressed in the bill is not determinable and
the property [sic] of many union activities now considered as
normal union functions
38 is shrouded with the blanket of uncertainty and confusion.
Despite the fears of organized labor, it is clear that the fiduciary responsibilities of an administrator differ from those of a
corporate director and that the fiduciary obligations of a union
official differ from either those of an administrator or a corporate
36. The phrase "taking into account the special problems and
functions of a labor organization" does not clearly indicate its referent.
Although this phrase could be given a narrow construction and held to
apply only to union officers, it seems more logical to say that it is directed at both union officers and the courts. See Counsel Fees 451 n.49.
37. See Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48 GEo.
L.J. 277, 290 (1959).
38. 105 CONG. REC. A6402 (1959), LEG. HIST. 1048.
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director. Although some older cases fail to make this important
differentiation, 39 substantially all modern cases distinguish between the duties imposed upon various types of fiduciaries. Section 501 (a)'s special problems and functions provision only makes
explicit what is already implicit. The legislative history confirms this.
The supplementary views of those congressmen who sponsored the fiduciary provision which was subsequently enacted
include the following statement:
The general principles stated in the bill are familiar to the
courts, both State and Federal, and therefore incorporate a
large body of existing law applicable to trustees, and a wide
variety of agents. The detailed application of these fiduciary
principles to a particular trustee, officer, or agent has always
depended upon the character of the activity in which he was
engaged. They bear upon a family trustee somewhat differently than a corporate director, upon an attorney quite differently than a real estate agent. The bill wisely takes note of
the need to consider "the special problems and functions of a
in applying fiduciary principles to their offilabor organization"
4 o
cers and agents.

Thus, the purpose of the special problems and functions provision in section 501 (a) is clear. 41 It is an affirmative directive to
the courts to take into account the special characteristics of
unions when determining the fiduciary obligations of union officials.
39.

42

See, e.g., Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 38 N.J.L. 505 (Sup. Ct.

1875); Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553, 570, 571
(N.Y. 1859); N. LATTIn & R. JENNINGS, MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
416-17 (3d ed. 1959).
40. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959). For further
substantiation, see 105 CONG. REc. 17,900 (1959) (remarks of Senator
John Kennedy), LEG. HXST. 1075; 105 CONG. REC. A6573 (1959) (remarks
of Representative Brademas), LEG. HIsT. 1051; 105 CONG. REc. 14,989-90
(1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), LEG. HIST. 1059.
41. The United States Chamber of Commerce, however, concluded
[was] created by limiting the fiduciary duty
that "a major loophole ...
to take into account the special problems and functions of a labor organization." 105 CONG. REc. 14,274 (1959), LEG. HfisT. 1049. Representative Brademas made a direct reply to this assertion:
The bill imposes upon labor union officials the responsibilities
of a fiduciary. The exact application of general fiduciary principles always takes into account the nature of the enterprise.
A corporate director is not judged in exactly the same fashion
as a family trustee, but both are subject to the highest duty of
fiduciary responsibility. The bill establishes exactly the same
test for union officials.
105 CONG. REc. A6573 (1959), LEG. HIST. 1051. Accord, 105 CONG. REC.
14,989 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), LEG. HIST. 1059.
42. For a particularly interesting case which considered the function of an international president and 'his relation to the local union,
see Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976
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D. THE EXTENT TO WincH SECTION 501's FiDuciARY DuTIES ARE
AFFECTED BY A UNION'S CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWs

Following the special problems and functions provision, the
second sentence of section 501(a) declares that it is the duty of
union officials
to hold its [the union's] money and property solely for the
benefit of the organization and its members and to manage,
invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies
[Emphasis added.]
adopted thereunder ....

This provision allows unions to authorize expenditures in their
constitutions and bylaws which would be plainly violative of
section 501(a) if made without such authorization. For example, if a union official invests union funds in speculative common
stock and there is no provision in the union's constitution and
bylaws authorizing such investments, the official will surely be
found to have violated his fiduciary obligations and, consequently, will be personally liable for any losses. However, if the
union's constitution and bylaws specifically permit investments
in speculative securities, then the union official can invest the
union's funds in such securities without any fear of violating
the fiduciary duties imposed by section 501 (a).43
If a literal interpretation is given to this provision, no expenditures authorized by a union's constitution or bylaws can
44
be the basis for a suit under section 501. Both Professors Smith
5
4
and Cox have assumed this to be the correct interpretation.
The latter observed that
An agent who follows the instructions of his principal is not
guilty of a breach of fiduciary duties. Section 501 emphasizes the importance of giving careful attention to the constitutional provisions and resolutions of governing bodies, but where
the union grants the necessary authority, no statutory restric(1963). Although the court did not specifically mention § 501, it held
that the international president did not breach any fiduciary obligation, inter alia, by denying the local union the right to strike under the
circumstances presented and by revoking the charter of the local union
when it struck without authorization.
43. See Dugan, supra note 37, at 299-301.
44. What the act does require is that expenditures of union
funds, as well as use of its other assets, be exclusively for purposes which are authorized by its constitution, bylaws, and any
pertinent regulations of its governing body. The standard is
the internal law of the union.
Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46
VA. L. REv. 195, 228 (1960).
45. A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLcY 92 (1960); see
Ostrin, Fiduciary Obligations of Union Officers: A Critical Analysis of
Section 501, in SyMvosrur 528, 533.
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tion is imposed. 46

Although the legislative history appears to support this position,47 it is hard to believe that Congress actually intended a
union's constitution and bylaws to stand as an absolute defense
to any action under the Act challenging an expenditure made
in conformity with such constitution and bylaws. It is not particularly surprising, therefore, that the courts 48 and several com-

mentators 49 have taken the view that a union's constitution and
bylaws are not a complete defense in actions contesting the validity of certain expenditures.
In Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen,50 the question before
the court was whether the plaintif members could enjoin the
use of union funds to pay the counsel fees of certain union officers who were charged with conspiracy to defraud the union in
46. A. Cox, supra note 45, at 92.
47. Union officers will not be guilty of breach of trust when
their expenditures are within the authority conferred upon them
either by the constitution and bylaws or by a resolution of the
executive board, convention or other appropriate governing
body (including a general meeting of the members) not in conflict with the constitution and bylaws.
H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959). Senator John Kennedy in making the conference committee report to the Senate used
practically identical language. 105 CoNG. REc. 17,900 (1959), LEG. HIST.
1075. Similar statements appear in the following: 105 CONG. REC. 15,690
(1959) (remarks of Representative O'Hara), LEG. HIST. 1065; 105 CONG.
REc. A6573 (1959) (remarks of Representative Brademas), LEG. HIST.
1050; 105 CONG. REC. 14,988 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), LEG.
Hisr. 1058. See Local 92, Iron Workers v. Norris, 66 L.R.R.M. 2297,
2299 (5th Cir. 1967).
The legislative history was by no means unanimous, as the following statement by Representative Barden, Chairman of the House Labor
Committee, indicates:
The purposes for which funds of a labor organization may be
expended or invested will necessarily ... be restricted and
limited ... regardless of any provisions in the constitution, bylaws or resolution of a labor organization....
105 CONG. REC. 18,153 (1959), LEG. HisT. 1077.
48. See, e.g., Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn.), affd,
325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963); Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833 (1961).
49. Note, The FiduciaryDuty of Union Officers Under the LMRDA:
A Guide to the Interpretation of Section 501, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 486,
493-502 (1962); Counsel Fees 448-52. See Wollett, supra note 6, at 277:
"[T]he fiduciary responsibilities created by section 501 are not derived
from or necessarily limited by the so.-called 'contract' between and
among the members embodied in the union constitution and bylaws."
See also Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MODEN L. REV. 273, 297-98 (1962).
50. 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa.), afj'd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961). See Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp.
233, 270-73 (D.Minn.), affd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
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the Pennsylvania state courts and with violating section 501 in
a federal court. The defendants asserted that a resolution passed
by the local union authorizing the use of union funds to pay for
any counsel fees incurred by the officers made such expenditures
valid and thus immune from attack under section 501. 1
The court viewed the matter differently. In granting an
injunction, it held that the resolution passed by the local membership was invalid on two grounds. First, the court held that
the resolution was ultra vires in that it was "beyond the power of
Local 107 to make.152 Second, the court ruled that passage of the
resolution was no defense since the resolution was "inconsistent
with the aims and purposes of the ... [LMRDA] and violates
53
The court said, in effect, that even
the spirit of the act."1
though an expenditure may be authorized by the union's constitution and bylaws, judicial scrutiny of the expenditure to ascertain whether it is consistent with the aims and purposes of the
Act is not foreclosed.
This second ground was an alternative holding, but later
decisions in related litigation indicate that it was the more important one. Thus, the district court in deciding another facet
of this case some three years later observed that the LMRDA
was "the primary basis for prohibiting payment of defendants'
attorney fees."5 4 Moreover, the court noted that passage of a
constitutional amendment allowing the use of the union's funds
to pay the counsel fees of union officers charged with violating
the law made no difference in the outcome. 5 In any event, the
decision in Cohen established an important precedent for the
proposition that expenditures made pursuant to the constitution
and bylaws of a union are not necessarily immune from judicial
attack,5 0 even though a literal reading of the language of sec51. There is some legislative history which supports this proposition. Representative Brademas agreed with an assertion made by
the United States Chamber of Commerce that the Act allowed a union
to pay the costs of defending union officials charged with violating the
Act, stating: "Union members will be free to decide whether they
wish to pay these costs or not." 105 CONG. REC. A6573 (1959), LEG. H sT.
1050.
52. 182 F. Supp. at 620.
53. Id.
54. Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 215 F. Supp. 938, 940 (E.D.
Pa. 1963), af'd, 334 F.2d 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 921 (1964).
But see Wollett, supra note 6, at 280.
55. 215 F. Supp. at 940-41.
56. But see Guarnaccia v. Kenin, 234 F. Supp. 429, 444 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd sub nom. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964), where the
court in an alternative holding apparently held that where an officer
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tion 501(a) would seem to indicate otherwise. The desirability
7
of this holding becomes apparent upon closer examination.5
One of the abuses uncovered by the McClellan investigations
was the political manipulation of some union treasuries by
68
Senator John Kennedy
powerful and despotic union leaders.
observed that "there is no doubt that a good many of the racketeers are able to dominate the unions in such a way that they
can get money under almost any guise in order to defend themselves." 59 However, if all union expenditures made "in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the
governing bodies adopted thereunder" are to be considered automatically nonviolative of section 501, then for all intents and
purposes the union would have the "ability to shape the con60
It is doubtful that
tours of its officers' fiduciary obligations."
legislative histhe
While
Congress intended such a result.
autonomous
fairly
have
to
are
tory definitely shows that unions
6
discloses a
also
"it
'
funds,
control over the expenditure of their
occasome
on
should
congressional intent that judicial judgment
meinternal
the
of
sions supersede union decisions regardless
62
Assuming,
made."
were
chanism by which those decisions
therefore, that judicial intervention in certain limited instances
is not only desirable but also permissible under section 501, the
question then is one of when such intervention should occur. It
is submitted that judicial intervention should occur only in those
rare instances where it is clear that union officials have obtained
authorization for an expenditure of union funds which accrues
to their own personal benefit, whether by amendment to the
acts in accordance with a union's constitution, there can be no breach of
fiduciary duties: "[Tihe Local officers, rather than breaching any
fiduciary obligations, are in fact acting in conformity with the Local's
Constitution and the overriding AFM Constitution."
57. See generally Counsel Fees 448-52; Note, The FiduciaryDuty of
Union Officers Under the LMRDA: A Guide to the Interpretation of
Section 501, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 486, 493-505 (1962).
58. Interim Report of the Select Comm. on Improper Activities in
the Labor or Management Field, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958). See 105 CONG. REc. 6524 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan), LEG. I-ST. 1020; Summers, supra note 49, at 297-98.
59. 105 CONG. REc. 6691 (1959), LEG. HisT. 1034.
60. Counsel Fees 449.
61. "Our language does not purport to regulate the expenditures
or investments of a labor organization. Such decisions should be made
by the members . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81
(1959). See note 38 supra; see also Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134,
140 (1964), where the Court noted that there was an underlying "general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in resolving
"
their own internal controversies..
62. Counsel Fees 449.
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union's constitution or bylaws or by membership resolution.

Where the expenditure does not accrue to their own personal
should protect union officials from
benefit, the authorization
63
any liability.
E.

GNERAL EXCULPATORY PROVISIONS

The last sentence of section 501 (a) provides that any general
exculpatory provision included in a union's constitution and bylaws or enacted as a resolution by a governing body of a union
which purports "to relieve any such person [i.e., union official]
of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section shall
be void as against public policy." 64 Thus, it is clear that a union
could not, for example, enact a constitutional provision which
provided that union officials have no fiduciary responsibilities
with respect to any of the funds or assets of the union.6 5 However, it is not so clear that section 501 (a)'s provision against exculpatory clauses bars a union from excusing particularbreaches
of the fiduciary duties set forth in section 501 (a). 6 For instance,
the governing body of a union could pass a valid resolution
purporting to absolve a union official from any personal liability for losses incurred by the improvident investment of
union funds in second mortgages. Resort to the legislative history provides some help in dispelling the uncertainty on this
question.
Senator Goldwater, in his analysis of the bill, observed that
while union officers may not be excused from their fiduciary obligations "by any general exculpatory union provision or action,
they may be relieved by a specific exculpation . ... ,"67 The
views of the House sponsors of section 501(a) militate against
his view, however,
63. One commentator proposed the following solution:
[A]s fiduciary questions under section 501 acquire an increasingly political complexion-for example, where counsel fees are
involved-it becomes appropriate for courts to take an increasingly firm hand over the course of union expenditures in order
to provide maximum protection for the organzation's fiscal wellbeing, even at the expense of disregarding the products of
union democracy.
Id. at 452.
64. See generally Dugan, supra note 37, at 299-301; Ostrin, supra
note 45, at 533-36.
65. See Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833
(1961); Wollett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13 N.Y.U.
ANN. CON.

ON LABOR 267, 270 (1960).

66. Wollett, supra note 65, at 270.
67. 105 CoNG. REc. 16,149 (1959), Lsa. HisT. 1068 (emphasis added).
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explicitly invalidates any general
[T]he committee bill ...
provision in a union constitution or bylaws purporting to excuse
union officials from breaches of trust. The bill follows the wellestablished distinction between conferring authority upon an
agent or trustee, which is permissible and protects him against
of trust, which is
liability, and attempting to excuse breaches
68
here made void as against public policy.
A reasonable application of this position expressed by the House
sponsors would bar a union from relieving an official from liability since any attempt "to excuse breaches of trust" is said to be
void. On the other hand, it seems clear from the above statement that a union could validly authorize the investment of its
funds in second mortgages, and that if a union officer invested
union funds pursuant to such an authorization, he could not at a
later date be held responsible for -ay losses.69 From a policy
standpoint, unions should not be allowed to excuse specific
breaches by a union official of the duties imposed by section 501
(a) after they have occurred, 70 since powerful, even despotic,
union leaders might be able to manipulate their unions into ex
post facto authorization of such conduct. Thus, the views expressed by the sponsors of section 501 should be adopted in preference to the views of Senator Goldwater.
The only case to date which has considered the effect of the
exculpatory clause provision is Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen.71 There the plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin use of union
funds to pay the counsel fees of defendant officers who were
In attacking the resocharged with violating section 501 ().).72
68. H.R. RE_'. No. 741, 86th Cong., :Ist Sess. 81-82 (1959). Senator
John Kennedy made the same observation. 105 CoxG. REc. 17,900 (1959),
LEG. H Sr. 1075.
69. Dugan, supra note 37, at 300. Whereas a union can authorize
an officer to make expenditures which would otherwise subject the
officer to liability under § 501, it seems clear that a union could not
authorize a conflict of interest situation or pass a resolution allowing an
officer to profit from his position as an officer. Id. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
70. Cf. Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 334 F.2d 378, 381 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 921 (1964). But see Homer v. Ferron,
362 F.2d 224, 231 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966).
71. 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa.), af.Pd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
72. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra. The courts have
strictly limited the right of unions to intercede on behalf of union
officials in suits brought under § 501. See, e.g., Tucker v. Shaw, 378
F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1967) (union's regularly retained counsel disqualified
from representing union officials even though fees were to be paid by
defendant officers); Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1965)
(potential conflict of interest disqualifies same attorney from representing both union and union officials); Holdeman v. Sheldon, 204
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lution passed by the membership authorizing such an expenditure, the plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that it came "within the
express prohibition of § 501(a) against any 'general exculpatory
resolution.' "73 The court, however, held that the resolution was
not an exculpatory provision within the meaning of the Act,
reasoning as follows:
We must distinguish between a resolution which purports to
authorize action which is beyond the power of the union to do
and for that reason in violation of § 501 (a) when done by an
officer (such as the present Resolution) and a resolution which
purports to relieve an officer of liability for breach of the
duties declared in § 501(a).74
The court's conclusion is sound since the union by passing the
resolution attempted only to authorize the payment of the defendant officers' legal fees; it did not attempt to absolve them of
their guilt. It seems clear, however, that the union could not
pass a resolution absolving the officials from any personal liability to the union if they were subsequently found guilty.
III.
A.

THE ROLE OF THE COURTS UNDER SECTION 501

IN GENAL

The question of the role of the courts in interpreting and
applying section 501(a) was raised shortly after passage of the
LMRDA in the leading case of Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen.
After observing that section 501 "attempts to define in the broadest terms possible the duty which the new federal law imposes
F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 311 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1962)
(union's motion to intervene denied where union had no interest
independent of defendant officers); Moschetta v. Cross, 43 CCH Lab.
Cas. 17,057 (D.D.C. 1961) (union prohibited from furnishing or paying
counsel to defend union officials charged with breach of fiduciary duty).
Cf. Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962). But see Highway
Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 620 (E.D. Pa. 1960):
There are undoubtedly situations in which a suit against a
union officer would have a direct and injurious effect upon the
union itself or would in reality be directed at the union. In
such a situation the union would have the power to lend its
support to such officer.
See generally Counsel Fees.
Although the question has not yet been decided, there is dicta that
nothing in the LMRDA would prohibit a union from reimbursing union
officials for the legal fees incurred in successfully defending against a
§ 501 suit. See, e.g., Holdeman v. Sheldon, supra at 3; Tucker v. Shaw,
11,502, n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 378 F.2d 304
54 CCH Lab. Cas.
(2d Cir. 1967). Cf. Murphy v. Washington American League Baseball
Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
73. 182 F. Supp. at 617.
74. Id. at 618 (emphasis in the original).
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upon a union official" and that "Congress made no attempt to
'codify' the law in this area," 75 the court stated:
It appears evident to us that they [Congress] intended the federal courts to fashion a new federal law in this area, in much
the same way that the federal courts have fashioned a new substantive law of collective bargaining contracts under § 301(a)
of the Taft-Hartley Act ....

See Textile Workers Union of

America v. Lincoln Mills, 1957, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 923, 1
L. Ed. 2d 972. In undertaking this task the federal courts
will necessarily rely heavily upon the common law of the
various states. Where that law is lacking or where it in any
way conflicts with the policy expressed in our national labor
laws, the latter will of course be our guide.
We turn then to Section 501, not expecting to find a detailed command or prohibition as to the particular act comguide which, properly
plained of, but rather to find a general
7
developed, will lead us to an answer. 6
Although the Lincoln Mills case -was not specifically referred
7
to in the legislative history of section 501, 7 the analogy is

sound.78 Indeed, it finds some implied support in Senator
Javits' statement that "[o]nce fiduciary responsibility is stated
it will soak up all the common law, all the State law, and all
the Federal law. ' 79 Hence, the role of the courts seems clear.
As stated by one court, "in ascertaining the fiduciary duty imposed by section 501 it will be both necessary and desirable to
examine closely the policy and purposes of L.M.R.D.A. and to
rely with confidence on the applicable state decisions."80 Consequently, it is important to ascertain the nature and extent of the
8
fiduciary duties imposed upon union officials at common law. '
B.

THE FiDucwARY DuTIEs OF UNION OFFIcIALs AT Co1mnmoN LAW

It is clear that union officials were considered fiduciaries at
common law.8 2 Nevertheless, the state courts have been vague
75. 182 F. Supp. at 617.
76. Id. Accord, Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 241-42, 246-47
(D. Minn.), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963); Penuelas v. Moreno,
198 F. Supp. 441, 447 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
77. Dugan, supra note 37, at 298.
78. Id. Contra, Klein, UAW Public Review Board Report, 18 RUTr.Eis L. REv. 304, 327-28 (1964).
79. 105 CONG. REc. 6524 (1959), Lwc;. HIsT. 1020.
80. Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 242 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 325
F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). Cf. Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886, 904 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).

81. See generally Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Union Officers Under the LMRDA: A Guide to the Interpretation of Section 501, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 486, 489-93 (1962); Wollett, supra note 65, at 276-77;
Dugan, supra note 37, at 279-83.
82. See, e.g., House v. Schwartz, 18 Misc. 2d 21, 25, 188 N.Y.S.2d
308, 313 (Sup. Ct. 1959). "Despite the scarcity of direct precedent, it
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in delineating the exact nature of the fiduciary duties which a
union official owes to his union.8 3 Sometimes the obligation
imposed is said to spring from the union's constitution or bylaws.8 4

In other instances, a union officer has been designated

either a fiduciary8 5 or a trustee.8 6 Occasionally a court manages
to utilize all of these theories in the same case.8 7 As a consequence, the development of state law has been at best uneven,
and the remedies available for seemingly clear breaches of fiduciary duties have been uncertain.8 8 A review of several state
cases illustrates this point.
In Schimmel v. Messing89 a testimonial banquet was given
by a local union for two retiring business agents. Net proceeds
of thirty thousand dollars were raised and presented to the two
business agents for their own personal use. Although the court
said it looked with disfavor "upon testimonial dinners being
seems plain that all union officers and employees have always been
subject to the usual common-law fiduciary duties of an agent." Cox,
Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 827 (1960). See Mintz, Trade Union Abuses, 6
ST. JoHNs L. REV. 272, 308 (1932): "It should be recognized that union
officers are fiduciaries and their conduct should be controlled by the
exacting standards that equity prescribes."
Several months prior to the passage of the LMRDA, the New York
Improper Practices Act was signed into law. N.Y. LAB. LAw §§ 720-32
(McKinney 1965). Section 722 imposes certain fiduciary obligations
upon union officials and agents. See generally Katz, New York's
Improper Practices Act, 10 LAB. L.J. 557 (1959); Rubenstein, Proposed
Labor Legislation in New York, 9 LAB. L.J. 846 (1958). In Fitzgerald v.
Catherwood, 64 L.R.R.M. 2833 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court held the New
York Act is neither preempted by nor in conflict with the LMRDA.

See Summers, Pre-emption and the Labor Reform Act--Dual Rights
and Remedies, 22 OHio ST. L.J. 119, 140-41 (1961).
83. See Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48 Gao.
L.J. 277, 280 (1959); Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608,
612 (E.D. Pa.), afld, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
833 (1961).
84. See, e.g., Local 720, Int'l Hod Carriers v. Bednasek, 119 Colo.

586, 591, 205 P.2d 796, 798 (1949).
85. Steinmiller v. McKeon, 21 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd
mem., 261 App. Div. 899, 26 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1941), affd, 288 N.Y. 508,
41 N.E.2d 925 (1942).
86. See, e.g., International Union of United Brewery Workers v.

Becherer, 142 N.J. Eq. 561, 61 A.2d 16
87. See, e.g., Robinson v. Nick,
374, 386 (1940).
88. "[B]y and large, the cases,
to theory, specific application, and
at 276.

(Ch. 1948).
235 Mo. App. 461, 481, 136 S.W.2d
where they exist, are confusing as
remedy." Wollett, supra note 65,

89. 117 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Sup. Ct. 1952), affd mem., 282 App. Div.
777, 122 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1953), aftid per curiam, 306 N.Y. 841, 118 N.E.2d
904 (1954).
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tendered in the name of a union for the pecuniary benefit of an
individual guest of honor," 90 it held that the funds collected
were not union funds and that consequently there was no right
to an accounting with respect to such funds, even though there
was little doubt that the union officers were using their positions
for financial gain. It is to be hoped that such decisions will not
be forthcoming under section 501, particularly since that section
expressly states that a union official has the affirmative duty "to
account to the organization for any profit received by him in
whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by
'
him or under his direction on behalf of the organization."91
92
In Vaccaro v. Gentile the court admitted that the defendant officers had improperly commingled funds from the union's
pension and welfare fund with the union's general funds. Nevertheless, an accounting was not granted, since the officers had
apparently acted honestly and in good faith. One commentator
noted:
It seems clear that the court was straining to protect officers
who were apparently honest but unskilled in financial affairs;
and had the court been committed to a view that union officers
or fiduciaries, its task would
were to be regarded as trustees
93
have been much more difficult.
It is rather doubtful whether such a result could be justified
under section 501.
This brief but representative sampling indicates that courts,
faced with the task of defining the scope and nature of the fidu90. 117 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29.
91. See S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 130-31 (1958); Summers, Legislating Union Democracy, in PROCEEINGS OF TENTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARcH AssocIATION 228, 235-36

(1958).

The United States Chamber of Conmmerce in its analysis of § 501(a)
stated that a "major loophole arises from the fact that no accountability
is required for profits reaped by an official who uses his office (not
105 CONG. REC. 14,274
union funds) to his personal advantage."
(1959), LEG. HisT. 1049. Representative Brademas responded directly
to this assertion:

This is a complete misrepresentation. Section 501(a) explicitly requires union officials "to account to the organization for

any profit received by him in whatever capacity in connection

with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on
behalf of the organization." The same section also forbids a
union officer "from holding or acquiring any personal interest
which conflicts with the interests of such organization ...."
105 CONG. REC. A6573 (1959), LEG. HIsT. 1057. Accord, 105 CONG. REC.
14,989-90 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), LEG. HIST. 1059.
92. 138 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
93. Note, The FiduciaryDuty of Union Officers Under the LMRDA:
A Guide to the Interpretation of Section 501, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 486,
491-92 (1962).

See Dugan, supra note 83, at 281.
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ciary duties imposed by section 501, will find little real help in
the state cases. This conclusion is further supported by the fact
that there are surprisingly few state cases; 94 and, even in those
cases where relief has been granted, the facts usually show the
grossest sort of misappropriation of union funds 95 It is evident
that the courts will have to look elsewhere for assistance.
C. THE APPLICATON OF T
CoNExTS

LAW OF FDuCImms iN OTm

Professor Donald H. Wollett in an article on fiduciary problems under the Landrum-Griffin Act has noted the inadequacy
of the common law as authority for defining the fiduciary responsibilities of union officials. As another source of rules applicable to these officers, he suggests the well developed doctrines
in the areas of principal-agent, trustee-beneficiary, and directorcorporation. 6 His suggestion is a good one. There is substantial
support in the legislative history for referring to other fields of
law in developing substantive law under section 501.
The relevant House report declared that "[t]he general principles stated in the bill are familiar to the courts, both State and
Federal, and therefore incorporate a large body of existing law
applicable to trustees, and a wide variety of agents."9 7 In addition, Senator Goldwater attempted to remove any uncertainty
as to the intended scope of the term fiduciary by introducing the
following definitions into the CongressionalRecord:
A fiduciary is a person whose relation to another is such
that he is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other, as to
matters within the scope of the relation. (Restatement of law
trusts.)
"The term 'fiduciary' involves the idea of trust, confidence.
It refers to the integrity-the fidelity-of the party trusted
rather than his credit or ability. It contemplates good faith,
rather than legal obligation, as the basis of the transaction."
(Stoll v. King, N.Y. 8 How. Proc. 299.)
'Partners occupy toward each other, as to the partnership
business, a fiduciary relation." (Bouvier.)
"Money is received in a fiduciary capacity when it does not
become the absolute property of the one receiving it, but is
received for a particular purpose, in which other persons than
the one receiving it are interested." (265 F. 343.) 98
94. See Minority Views Accompanying Report from Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, S. RE. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 72
(1959).
95. Dugan, supra note 83, at 279-80. See Wollett, supra note 65,
at 276.
96. See Wollett, supra note 65, at 277.
97. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959).
98. 105 CoNG. REc. 6528 (1959), LE. HisT. 1027.
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Whatever use is made of this body of existing law must be qualified by the direction of section 501 (a) to take into account the
special problems and functions of a labor union. 99
Not unexpectedly, the courts have made frequent reference
to the law in analogous fiduciary situations in resolving cases
arising under section 501. In Cohen the court, in deciding
whether it was legal for a union to pay the attorneys' fees of defendant officers who were charged with looting the union's treasury, made the following comment: "[W] e feel that those cases
involving the use of corporate funds to pay the defense of officers
charged with misconduct in office are helpful. 10 0 Similarly, in
Nelson v. Johnson,'0 ' the court looked to state precedent in
shareholder derivative suits in determining whether plaintiffs
were entitled to attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting a successful action under Title I of the LMRDA.102 Accordingly, the body
of fiduciary law developed in other situations, especially in the
area of remedies, should be of considerable assistance to the
courts in their arduous task of interpreting and applying the
fiduciary provisions of the LMRDA.

D. THE FmuciARY STANDARDS WITHIN"THE ACT ITSELF
Several provisions in the LMIDA itself should be quite
helpful to the courts in ascertaining what fiduciary duties are
imposed upon union officials. Title I1103 requires most unions,
union officers, and union employees to file fairly extensive financial reports with the Secretary of Labor. Criminal penalties
are provided for failure to make such reports and for knowingly
99. See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
100. Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 619 (E.D.
Pa.), affd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
101. 212 F. Supp. 233 (D.Minn.), affd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
102. Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 298-99 (D. Minn.), affd,
325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). See Gilbert v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs,
Local 701, 237 Ore. 130, 384 P.2d 136 (1963),

cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963

(1964).
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-40 (1964), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 435, 437,
441 (Supp. I, 1965). See Teamsters, Local 760 v. Morley, 378 F.2d 738
(9th Cir. 1967) (union members have an enforceable right to examine
union's records to verify reports filed by union pursuant to LMRDA).

See generally Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REv. 195, 210-21 (:1960).

In Teamsters v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court held
that institution of a § 501 suit does not deprive the Secretary of Labor
from using his broad investigative and subpoena powers under the
Act to aid the suing members to obtain information as to their union's
financial affairs.
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making false statements. In addition, section 205(b) provides
that all such reports "shall be public information," and that
"the Secretary shall by regulation make reasonable provision
for the inspection and examination, on the request of any person, of the information and data contained in any report or
other document filed with him . .. -"104 Congress believed
that if it provided union members with sufficient information
about the union's financial affairs, they would be greatly aided
in uncovering breaches of the fiduciary obligations imposed by
section 501 (a) .105
Perhaps the most important provision in Title II is section
202(a) which requires union officers and union employees, except clerical or custodial employees, to file a report with respect
to six possible conflict of interest situations.1 0
For example,
section 202(a) (1) requires that any such officer or employee
must disclose any interest or income, other than wages, which he,
his spouse, or his minor child has received from an employer
whose employees his union either represents or is actively seeking to represent. It seems evident that an officer who reports
any such interest or income has violated the section 501 (a) requirement against "holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of" his union.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 435 (1964), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 435 (Supp.
1, 1965).
105. The relevant House of Representatives Report noted:
Section 501 of the committee bill provides that the officers,
agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of labor organizations occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group.
The Government which vests in labor unions the power to
act as exclusive bargaining representative must make certain
that this power is exercised for the benefit of the employees
whom the unions represent for purposes of collective bargaining and not for the personal profit and advantage of the
officers and representatives of the union.
The committee bill attacks the problem by requiring officers and employees of unions to file reports with the Secretary
of Labor disclosing to union members and the general public
any investments or transactions in which their personal financial interests may conflict with their duties to the members.
H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1959). See Stein, Union
Finance and LMRDA, in

REGULATING

UNION GOVERNMENT 130, 145: "[T]he

reporting provisions of Title II mean that it will be much easier than
formerly to 'spot' wrongdoing on the part of union officials, and these
provisions, therefore, play a central role in the legislative scheme." Since
the reporting provisions of Title H deal exclusively with financial
matters, it is also arguable that § 501 extends only to financial matters.
But see text accompanying notes 10-35 supra.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 432(a) (1964).
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Even if such interest or income is not received by the officer, but
rather is received by his wife and/or minor child, section 202
(a) (1) still compels disclosure. Applying the section 202 (a) (1)
standard, it is arguable that this is also a violation of section
501(a), even though that section seemingly prohibits only the
10 7
officer himself from acquiring or holding conflicting interests.
Such a result is desirable, since the contrary result creates a
gaping loophole for the evasion of the fiduciary obligations imposed by the Act.
Other provisions in the Act explicitly prohibit certain expenditures. For example, section 401(g) proscribes the use of
union funds "to promote the candidacy of any person in an election subject to the provisions of" Title IV. 10 8 Consequently, any
union official who allows such an expenditure is surely guilty of
a breach of his fiduciary duties. As a result, any union member
can sue him to recover any sums thus spent. Another example
is section 503 (a)109 which forbids unions from making loans to
any officer or employee in excess o:! two thousand dollars. Although this section provides only criminal penalties for any violation thereof, presumably a union member could sue on behalf
of the union under section 501 to recover the amount of any
loan made in excess of two thousand dollars. 110
The courts, therefore, should not overlook the other provisions of the Act itself when trying to give meaning to the fiduciary obligations set forth in section 501(a). Indeed, the courts
have a duty to take these provisions into consideration when
construing section 501, since it is a -well established principle of
statutory construction that one section of an act is not to be construed and interpreted in isolation from the other sections of the
act."'1
107. One of the many abuses uncovered by the McClellan Committee's investigation of the Teamsters was the fact that Hoffa's wife
shared profits of $125,000 from a company whose employees were represented by the Teamsters. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 250
(1958). See Summers, supra note 91.
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-84 (1964). See generally Smith, supra note
103, at 223-27; Cox, supra note 82, at 842-46. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Cohen, 203 Pa. Super. 34, 199 A.2d 139, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964).
109. See Stein, supra note 105, at 146.
110. See Wollett, supra note 65, at 274. Cf. 104 CoiqG. REC. 11,14546 (1958) (remarks of Senators Bush, Ives and Curtis), LEG. HIsT. 915-16.
111. See J. SuTBmmLAND, STATUTORY CoNsmucTiON § 4703 (3d ed.
1943); NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S.. 282 (1957); United States v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952); Markham v. Cabell,
326 U.S. 404 (1945).
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IV. THE ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF

SECTION 501(b)
A. IN GENERAL
The provisions of section 501(b) provide the legal means by
which a union member can seek judicial enforcement of the fiduciary obligations set forth in subsection (a) .112 The type of suit
envisioned by section 501(b) has been likened to a stockholder's
derivative suit in the corporate context." 3 In both instances the
suit is brought in a representative capacity, and any recovery is
solely for the benefit of the organization. The conditions precedent to bringing a suit are also somewhat similar to those for a
stockholder's derivative suit, in that a suit can be brought only
after the organization has been requested to take some action and
has either refused or failed to do so. However, despite its similarity to the stockholder's derivative suit and its apparent simplicity, section 501(b) has caused the courts considerable difficulty.
B.

REQUIREMENT THAT PLAINTIFF FIRST ASK THE UNION TO ACT

The first sentence of section 501(b) provides, in part, that
when any union official
is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a)
and the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting
or other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being
requested to do so by any member of the labor organization,
such member may sue such . .. [official] in any district court
of the United States or in any State court of competent jurisdiction ....
As one court has noted, the wording of section 501 (b) "is not
artful."" 4 The first sentence states that a union member may
112. In Gilbert v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs, Local 701, 237 Ore.
130, 135-36, 384 P.2d 136, 138-39 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964),
the Oregon Supreme Court held that the procedures specified in § 501
(b) were not binding on state courts. See generally Summers, The
Impact of Landrum-Ckiffin in State Courts, 13 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNF. ON
LABOR 333 (1960).
113. Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 297 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 325
F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). The following remarks of Representative
Elliott are also relevant:
Section 501(b) provides that if the union fails to bring suit
upon the request of the member, the member may apply to
any State or Federal court for leave to bring an action on behalf of the organization similar to a minority stockholder's suit
against a corporation.
105 CONG. Rzc. 15,549 (1959), LEG. HIST. 1060.

114. Penuelas v. Moreno, 198 F. Supp. 441, 443 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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bring suit for alleged violations of subsection (a) if the union
has failed or refused "to sue or recover damages or secure an
accounting or other appropriate relief ... ." [Emphasis added.]
The use of the word "or" following the words "to sue" is what
causes difficulty. It is arguable that this provision means a
union must either fail or refuse to bring suit or fail or refuse to
take some other appropriate action. If, however, section 501(b)
stated that a union member could sue if he made his request
and the union failed or refused "to sue to recover damages, or
secure an accounting or other appropriate relief .

.

." there

would be little doubt that a union must bring suit in order to
satisfy the requirements of section 501 (b).
The bill reported by the House Committee on Education
and Labor and the identical bills introduced by Representatives
Landrum and Griffin did utilize the word "to" following the
words "to sue." 1 5 Moreover, the House sponsors of section 501
stated that a union member could bring an action "if the union
refuses to sue .

. .

."16

It is quite possible that a mistake was

made in the printing of the bill as finally enacted and that the
word "or" was mistakenly inserted in place of the word "to."
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that this change in
wording was the result of any conscious action by Congress.
The conclusion that a union must sue is further substantiated by congressional analyses of section 501(b). Representative Elliott, one of the sponsors of the section, observed that
"[s]ection 501 (b) provides that if the union fails to bring suit
upon the request of the member, the member may . . . bring
an action .... 11117 Senator Morse noted that "section 501 (b)

authorizes an individual member, when these rules are violated
and the union fails to sue, to bring a suit . .

"118

Since the

115. H.R. 8342 (Elliott bill), H.R. 8400 (Landrum bill), H.R. 8401
(Griffin bill), 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501(b) (1959). Indeed, the engrossed copy of H.R. 8342 passed by the House contained the word "to"
instead of the word "or." 105 CONG. REC. 15,888 (1959), LEG. HIsT. 1066.
116. H.R. RaP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1959).
117.
118.

105 CoNG. REc. 15,549 (1959) (emphasis added), LEG. HisT. 1060.
105 CONG. REC. 14,990 (1959) (emphasis added), LEG. HisT. 1059.

But see 105 CONG. REC. 19,766 (1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater),
LEG. HiST. 1137.

The position that the union has to bring suit was echoed by some
of the early commentators. Professor Cox, for example, said that a
member could bring suit "whenever his union refuses to sue an officer
or employee alleged to be guilty of a breach of fiduciary obligations."
Cox, supra note 82, at 828 (emphasis added). Also instructive is an
early analysis of § 501 by Arthur Goldberg, then General Counsel for
the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, wherein he stated that a
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legislative history fully justifies the conclusion that the word
"or" following the words "to sue" in the first sentence of section
501 (b) should be read as if it were the word "to," union members
should be permitted to sue only if the union refuses or fails to
institute court proceedings after being requested to do so. n 9
120
At least one court has so held.
After requesting the union to bring suit,'1 2

a member may

sue if the union fails or refuses to do so "within a reasonable
time." Although the term "reasonable time" is not defined, the
intent of Congress as to its meaning can be gleaned from the
legislative history with respect to a similar provision in the
Kennedy-Ervin bill. 22 Section 109(b) of that bill provided
that upon the conviction of any union officer or employee for
embezzlement or willful conversion of union funds a union
member could bring suit to recover such funds, provided that
"the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse
or fail to sue to recover such money or property or the value of
member may sue for alleged violations of § 501(a) "if the union or its
governing board or officers fail or refuse to bring such a suit within a
reasonable time after being requested to do so." A. GOLDBERG, ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING A= DIsCLosuRE ACT OF 1959,
at 25-26 (1959) (emphasis added).
119. It seems implicit in the Act that if a union does institute suit,
it must prosecute it with reasonable diligence. A sham suit should not
preclude a union member from bringing a bona fide action. See Duker,
FiduciaryResponsibility of Union Officials, in SYmposimU 519, 526.
120. Persico v. Daley, 239 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See Penue-

las v. Moreno, 198 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Contra, Moss v. Davis,
56 L.R.R.M. 2081 (M.D. Fla. 1963).
121. The literal language of § 501 (b) requires that the request to the
union must be made by the suing member and not by somebody who is
not a party to the action. At least two courts have adopted this view.
Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1965); Persico v. Daley,
239 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The House Committee Report supports this construction since it states that "the requesting member may
sue .... 1" H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1959). See
105 CONG. REc. 15,549 (1959) (remarks of Representative Elliott), LEG.
HIST. 1060. But see STAFF OF SENATE CoMivi. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLOsuRE ACT or 1959, at 14
(Comm. Print 1959), LEG. HIST. 846.
As for the request itself, the Second Circuit has held that "this
provision of the statute is mandatory and that its requirements cannot
be met by anything short of an actual request. An allegation of the
futility of such a request will not suffice." Coleman v. Railway &
S.S. Clerks, 340 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir. 1965). Accord, Teamsters v.
Hoffa, supra at 249-50; Persico v. Daley, supra at 631; Penuelas v.
Moreno, 198 F. Supp. 441, 449 (S.D. Cal. 1961). But see 104 CONG.
REC. 11,328 (1959) (remarks of Senator Javits), LEG. HIST. 949.
122. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109(b) (1959).
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the same within six calendar months after being requested to
do so by any member .... -123 Subsequently, Senator Javits in-

troduced an amendment which, inter alia, reduced the period to
four calendar months. 2 4 Prior to its passage, Senator Javits
stated:
As the bill now reads, there is a provision for a 6 months'
waiting period. I thought that was much too long, and I proposed 3 months. We are persuaded that the 4 months' provision is fair, because some of the union boards meet every quarter, and if we assume the major time lapse to be involved we
ought to give an opportunity for the board to meet and for the
member to decide whether to sue or not to sue. 125

Two interpretive guidelines emerge from these comments.
First, the governing body of a union should be given sufficient
time to consider a member's request at a regularly scheduled
meeting. 26 Second, the member should be given ample opportunity to deliberate on whether or not to bring suit.

27

These

two considerations should provide helpful guidance to the courts
in their efforts to construe the term "reasonable time," but it is
to be expected that results will differ from case to case depending
on the circumstances. As one commentator noted, "the urgency
of the particular situation will probably control."' 28

For exam-

ple, where an injunction is sought to prevent a union official
from making an allegedly illegal disbursement, the courts probably will allow the union considerably less time than where a
member is suing to challenge a disbursement already made.
C. THE "GOOD CAUSE"

REQUIREMENT

The second sentence of section 501(b) provides that "no
such proceeding shall be brought except upon leave of the court
obtained upon verified application amd for good cause shown,
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. 105 CONG. REc. 6529 (1959), LEG. HIsT. 1028.
125. Id.

126. This idea may be somewhat akin to the exhaustion doctrine.

See Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48 GEo. L.J. 277,
302 (1959); Wollett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13
N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 267, 270-71. Cf. Highway Truck Drivers
v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 622 n.9 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961). See generally text accompanying notes 140-50 infra.
127. An additional purpose might have been intended here. Upon
further consideration a union member might decide against rash action,
and the waiting period would thus serve as a "cooling off" period.
128. Dugan, supra note 126, at 303. See Note, The Fiduciary Duty

of Union Officers Under the LMRDA: A Guide to the Interpretationof
Section 501, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 486, 506-07 (1962).
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which application may be made ex parte.' '1 29 "Good cause" is
not defined by the Act, but there is fairly general agreement that
this provision was "intended as a safeguard to the union against
harassing and vexatious litigation brought without merit or good
faith."130 Beyond this, however, there is no consensus as to the
meaning and interpretation of the good cause provision.
At least three interpretations as to what constitutes good
cause have been suggested. First, good cause might mean nothing more than that a union member has requested the union to
sue and the union has either refused or failed to do so.' 3 ' Such
an interpretation would, however, reduce the good cause requirement to a mere redundancy. 32 Moreover, it is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted, if
possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. 133 Second, the
phrase might mean that the court should examine the union
member's complaint and then determine on its face whether it
states a good cause of action. 134 This interpretation would also
render the good cause provision largely meaningless since a legally sufficient complaint could nearly always be drafted without much difficulty. 35 The third suggested interpretation is by
far the best: the court should, after a hearing if necessary,
determine whether the plaintiff has made a showing of probable
cause. 3 1 Such an interpretation would give the good cause re129. Death of the union member filing the verified application
does not revoke its validity. Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224, 227 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966). Nor does death of the member
filing the verified application abate the cause of action or render it moot
where there are other plaintiffs to prosecute the action. Horner v.
Ferron, supra.
130. Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 622 n.10,

af-f'd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
Accord, Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385

U.S. 958 (1966). See Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HAuv. L. REV. 851, 895 (1960); Dugan, supra
note 126, at 302.
131. Counsel Fees 452.
132. Id. at 452-53. See Penuelas v. Moreno, 198 F. Supp. 441, 444
(S.D. Cal. 1961).
133. See F. McCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 35 (1953).
134. Counsel Fees 453.
135. But see Dugan, supra note 126, at 302: "[T]he reasonable construction would seem to be that if the pleadings disclose a valid cause
of action from the facts alleged, suit can be brought." Accord, Katz &

Friedman, Members' Control Over Officers, Elections and Finances:
Equitable Remedies and Modern Developments, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 97, 118
(1961). See also IBEW, Local 28 v. IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649 (D. Md.
1960) (allegations of complaint constitute "good cause" where verified).
136. Counsel Fees 453. In Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224, 229 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966), the court discussed what could
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quirement meaning, and, in addition, would give unions some
real protection against harassing and vexatious suits. The legislative history lends support to this interpretation.
An identical good cause provision was contained in the
Kennedy-Ervin bill which was adopted by the Senate. 137 In fact,
it appears as if LMRDA's good cause provision was taken in toto
from the Kennedy-Ervin bill. Consequently, the following
comment made by Senator Javits, one of the sponsors of the
good cause provision in the Kennedy-Ervin bill, is of particular
importance: "If the member is given leave to sue-in other
words, if he shows he complied with the statute and shows some
probable cause-he may sue. . . .,,13 It is significant that Senator Javits used the phrase "some probable cause." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "probable cause" as "a reasonable ground for
belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of."'1 39 A similar definition should be given to the good

cause provision in section 501(b).
In addition to these three interpretations of what constibe adduced at a hearing:

At such a hearing, if one is called, the court may, if it
chooses, look somewhat beyond the complaint in determining

whether the plaintiff has made the "good cause" showing required by section 501(b). Thus if the defendant can establish,
by undisputed affidavit, facts which demonstrate that the plaintiff is not a member of the defendant union, or that the action is
outlawed by a statute of limitations, or that the action cannot
succeed because of the application of the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel, or that plaintiff has not complied
with some controlling condition precedent to the bringing of
such a suit, then although these defects do not appear on the
face of the complaint, they may warrant denial of the application.
However, we think it inappropriate to consider, at such a
hearing, defenses which require the resolution of complex questions of law going to the substance of the case. Defenses of
this kind should be appraised only on motion for summary judgment or after a trial. Defenses which necessitate the determination of a genuine issue of material fact, being beyond the
scope of summary judgment procedure, are a fortiori, beyond
the scope of a proceeding to determine whether a section 501 (b)
complaint may be filed. Defenses involving disputed questions
of fact should be appraised only after a trial at which the
parties and the court can have the benefit of a complete inquiry, assisted by such pre-trial discovery as may be undertaken.
See Taxicab Drivers v. Eberhart, 57 L.R.R.M. 2207 (S.D. Ohio 1964) (state
court judgment res judicata to a similar federal court suit).
The court also ruled that "pre-trial discovery is not available to a
plaintiff suing under § 501(b), until after leave to file the complaint
has been granted." Homer v. Ferron, supra at 229 n.6. But see note 103
supra.
137. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109 kb) (1959).
138. 105 CONG. REC. 6529 (1959), LEG. HIST. 1028 (emphasis added).
139. H. BLACK, LAW DicTioxARY 1365 (4th ed. 1951).
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tutes good cause, several courts have added a fourth. These
courts hold that the good cause requirement contemplates reference to the exhaustion of internal remedies doctrine. 140 In
Penuelas v. Moreno,141 the court concluded "that the exhaustion
of remedies provision of Section 101 (a) (4) is a prerequisite to
...

federal jurisdiction under section 501 (b)

..

,,.4

The

court noted that it was "apparent that all policies favoring the
exhaustion prerequisite to Section 101 actions apply with equal
force to suits instituted pursuant to Section 501(b)."143
The holding in Penuelas is questionable at best, and several
courts have expressly rejected it. In Holdeman v. Sheldon 44 the
court reasoned:
[T]he fact that Congress made specific reference to exhaustion
of internal remedies under § 101(a) (4), . . . and adopted a
different procedure under § 501(b), both sections being enacted at the same time as part of a comprehensive revision of
the labor law, leads to the conclusion that the concept of first
exhausting internal remedies was knowingly omitted.' 45

In addition to section 101 (a) (4), the court could have mentioned
that Congress specifically provided in section 402(a)1 46 that a
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964).
141.
142.

198 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
Id. at 445. Accord, Morrissey v. Cocker, 57 L.R.R.M. 2400 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct. 1964); Moss v. Davis, 56 L.R.R.M. 2081 (M.D. Fla 1963); see
Echols v. Cook, 56 L.R.R.M. 3030 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Gray v. Reuther,
Civil No. 20,477 (E.D. Mich., filed Nov. 3, 1960). In addition, the
holding in Penuelas has been cited or quoted with apparent approval

in the following cases:

Jennings v. Carey, 57 L.R.R.M. 2635 (D.D.C.

1964), rev'd on other grounds, 58 L.R.R.M. 2606 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per
curiam); Coleman v. Railway & S.S. Clerks, 228 F. Supp. 276, 284

(S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd, 340 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1965); Deluhery v. Marine
Cooks & Stewards, 211 F. Supp. 529, 535 (S.D. Cal. 1962). Cf. Teamsters,
Local 760 v. Morley, 378 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1967).

See also Duker,

supra note 119, at 525. For criticism of the court's ruling in Penuelas,
see Note, Rights of Union Members: The Developing Law Under the
LMRDA, 48 VA. L. REv. 78, 92-93 (1962); ABA SEcTIoN OF LABOR
RELATIONS

LAW,

REPORT

oF

Commvi.

ON

UNION

ADmINISTRATION

AND

PROCEDURE 123 (1962).

143. 198 F. Supp. at 446.
144. 204 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 311 F.2d 2
(2d Cir. 1962). Accord, Homer v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224, 231 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); Persico v. Daley, 239 F. Supp. 629, 632
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Robinson v. Weir, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,536 (D. Neb.
1965); Schonfeld v. Rarback, 61 L.R.R.M. 2043 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See

also Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 257 n.26 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 325
F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
145. 204 F. Supp. at 896.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1964). Section 402(a), in relevant part,
provides:
A member of a labor organization(1) who has exhausted the remedies available under the
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union member must comply with certain prescribed exhaustion
of remedy requirements before filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging any violation of section 401. In any event,
it is submitted that the court in Hoodeman reached the correct
result. To utilize the good cause provision in section 501(b), as
the court in Penuelas did, and to say that the requirements of
section 101 (a) (4) are engrafted onto any suit brought under section 501(b) is contrary to both the language of the Act and
147
sound statutory construction.
The decision in Penuelas is also contrary to the position
taken by many state courts prior to the enactment of the
LMRDA. A typical case is Mooney v. Bartenders Union, Local
No. 284,148 wherein the California Supreme Court observed:
[I]t is to the best interests of the union that any misuse of its
funds be immediately revealed, and it would serve no useful
purpose to require that the examination of the books [be] delayed until the member has followed
the procedure required by
the union in ordinary matters. 149
It has also been suggested that the requirement of demand
and refusal upon the union, rather than the good cause provision,
was intended as the statutory counterpart of the "exhaustion"
doctrine in this area.'"0 However, it should not be assumed that
because there is some provision in section 501(b) which resembles
the exhaustion doctrine that the requirements of section 101 (a)
(4) are, perforce, engrafted onto that provision.
Finally, section 501 (b) provides that application for leave of
the court to sue may be made ex parte. Senator Goldwater
constitution and bylaws of such organization and of any parent body, or
(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision within three calendar months after their
invocation,
may file a complaint with the Secretary ....
147. In addition, it may be argued that suits brought under §
501(b) are analogous to stockholder derivative suits since relief is
sought for the benefit of the labor organization. On the other hand,
under Title I relief is sought by the individual union member on his
own behalf. Since these are basic differences, it is difficult to see how
section 101(a) (4)-applicable to suits brought under Title I-is likewise applicable to actions instituted under Title V.
148. 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957).
149. Id. at 844, 313 P.2d at 859. Accord, Nissen v. Teamsters, 229
Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941); Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461,
482-83, 136 S.W.2d 374, 387 (1940); Bell v. Sullivan, 183 Misc. 543, 49
N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Contra, Williams v. Vickers, 74 Nev. 48,
321 P.2d 586 (1958); Martin v. Favell, 344 Mich. 215, 73 N.W.2d 856
(1955).
150. ABA SEcTIoN OF LABOR RELATIoNs LAw, REPORT oF Comnw. ON
UNION ADMINISTRATION AND PRocEDURE 123 n.97 (1962).

1967]

SECTION 501

observed that an ex parte application was one which could be
made "without notice to the union to appear in court and offer
its defense."'r'l Since this statement accords with the usual judicial definition of the term,15 2 it should be accepted as correct.
Some questions have been raised, however, as to the advisability
of granting ex parte applications. 53 One court, for example,
after deciding that an ex parte order had been improperly issued,
made the following comment: "After our experience with this
case, we think the better practice will be to require an adversary
proceeding before permitting an action under Section 501(b) to
be filed."'" Certainly it would be far easier to detect harassing
and unmeritorious suits if adversary proceedings were required.
Although ex parte applications should be available in proper
circumstances, courts should nevertheless be quite hesitant in
granting them.
D.

REMIEs ENvIsioNE BY SEcTIoN 501 (b)

Section 501(b) expressly provides that a union member after
satisfying preliminary prerequisites to suit can sue "to recover
damages or secure an accounting. . . ." These remedies need no
explanation. Not so self-explanatory, however, is the further
provision in section 501(b) which allows a plaintiff to sue for
"other appropriate relief." Does this phrase contemplate the
granting of an injunction or a receivership? Or, assuming a
serious breach of trust, does it encompass the removal of a union
official from office? Unfortunately, the Act provides no easy

answers.
The phrase "other appropriate relief" has been at issue in
151. 105 CONG. REC. 19,766 (1959), LEG. HIsT. 1079. Senator Goldwater said the words "verified application" as used in § 501(b) meant
nothing more than "a sworn application." Id.
152. "A judicial proceeding, order, injunction, etc., is said to be ex
parte when it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of
one party only, and without notice to or contestation by, any person
adversely affected."

H. BLAcK, LAw DIcTIoNARY 662 (4th ed. 1951).

153. [C]ases which subsequently prove to have no merit are
being submitted to the federal district judges, thus conveying
the misleading impression to the membership and the public
generally that there has been gross misconduct and dishonesty
on the part of local union officers.
Previant, Have Titles I-VI of Landrum-Griffin Served the Stated Legislative Purpose?, 14 LAB. L.J. 28, 35 (1963). See Ostrin, Fiduciary
Obligations of Union Officers: A Critical Analysis of Section 501, in
Symposim 528, 532.
154. Penuelas v. Moreno, 198 F. Supp. 441, 449 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
But see Tucker v. Shaw, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. fI 11,502 (E.D.N.Y. 1966),
affd, 55 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,966 (2d Cir. 1967).
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only one case. In Nelson v. Johnsonr55 the defendants claimed the
phrase "did not ... apply in any context save that involving
money or property,"'156 and therefore the court was precluded
from granting an injunction against them. The court had no difficulty in finding authority for the issuance of an injunction in
the law of trusts: "It is hornbook law that trustees can be enjoined both to do their duty and also to refrain from violating
their duty."'16 7 The result reached by the court is correct. Although the question of remedies was given scant attention in
the legislative history, Senator Goldwater observed that a union
member could sue a union official "to recover damages or secure
an accounting or other appropriate relief-including injunctive
relief-for the benefit of the union."'158 Moreover, several courts
have apparently assumed that there was no question as to the
propriety of injunctions under section 501(b) since they have
granted them.6 59
Beyond injunctive relief, the question of whether a union
official can be removed for breach of a fiduciary obligation is
particularly troublesome. One commentator stated that the
words "other appropriate relief" make it "clear that the courts
. .have the right to remove [a] ... miscreant union official
from office.'1 60 This view was based "on the line of cases where
the courts have removed trustees from the administration of
the conventional trust for improper conduct."'16 Another commentator challenged this position, noting that "it appears to ignore altogether the importance that democratic processes have
in the union context and the complete absence of that factor in
the area of conventional trusts.' 1 62 The latter view is preferable,
particularly since section 401(h) of the LMRDA provides a specific method whereby "an elected officer guilty of serious misconduct . . . may be removed . . . ,,163 However, where the
*

155. 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn.), affd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
156. 212 F. Supp. at 284.
157. Id. at 288. Professor Cox observed that "all the usual remedies
for breach of trust are available." Cox, InternalAffairs of Labor Unions
Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 McH. L. REy. 819, 828 (1960).
158. 105 CONG. REC. 19,766 (1959), LE(;. IsT. 1079 (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 334 F.2d 378 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 921 (1964); Moschetta v. Cross, 43 CCH
Lab. Cas.

17,057 (D.D.C. 1961).

160. Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48 GEo.
L.J. 277, 295 (1965).
161. Id.
162. Counsel Fees 452 n.52 (1964). See Previant, supra note 153,
at 35.
163.

29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1964).

19671

SECTION 501

erring official is not "an elected official" within the meaning of
section 401(h), the equitable remedy of removal should be avail164
able.
There is some pre-LMRDA authority for the granting of
receiverships.' 6 5 Assuming arguendo that receiverships come
within the meaning of "other appropriate relief," the courts
should grant this remedy sparingly and then only when the circumstances clearly dictate its use. 60 In the union context, a
receivership is a drastic remedy since it "suspends the union's
bargaining power for the duration of the receivership period."' 6 7
E.

PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL FEES

The last sentence of section 501 (b) provides that the court
..may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action
under this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting this
suit at the instance of the member of the labor organization
and to compensate such member for any expenses necessarily
paid or incurred by him in connection with the litigation.
[Emphasis added.]
It might seem that this subsection provides only for what courts
have often done in other fiduciary contexts, that is, granting counsel fees to plaintiffs. The phrase which provides that
such counsel fees be "a reasonable part of the recovery" has, however, created considerable difficulty. If this phrase is given its
literal meaning, then some sort of monetary recovery by the
union would be a condition precedent to any award of counsel
fees. Such a construction would preclude awarding counsel
fees in suits to enjoin improper disbursements or suits to pre164. "Congress meant the remedy to be no less sophisticated than
the problem-the cure to be co-extensive with the malady." Nelson v.
Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 296 (D.Minn.), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.
1963). See Crocker v. Weil, 227 Ore. 260, 275, 361 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1961):
[W]hen an officer of a union, at any level, devotes his
energies and the members' money to retaining his place of
power and profit . . . he must forfeit his right to his office.

This duty is now codified into the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 as reaching the status of a fiduciary obligation.
Cf. Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 265 F. Supp. 510, 522 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
165. See, e.g., Mursener v. Forte, 186 Ore. 253, 205 P.2d 568 (1949);
Sibilia v. Western Elec. Employees Ass'n, 142 N.J. Eq. 77, 59 A.2d 251
(Ct. Err. & App. 1948). See also Gilligan v. Moving Picture Mach.
Operators, 135 N.J. Eq. 484, 39 A.2d 129 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944). See
generally Katz & Friedman, supra note 135, at 101-04.
166. Cf. Clinton v. Hueston, 308 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1962).
167. Note, The FiduciaryDuty of Union Officers Under the LMRDA:
A Guide to the Interpretation of Section 501, 37 N.Y.U.L. RLv. 486,
490 n.27 (1962).
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vent the commingling of union trust funds, both of which exemplify actions seeking nonmonetary relief which can be
brought under section 501. Moreover, such a construction would
be anomalous since the courts in other fiduciary contexts have
awarded counsel fees even though no pecuniary benefit was received by the party on whose behalf the suit was brought.1 08 Indeed, there are several state cases in which union members
have been awarded attorneys' fees where the benefit received
was of a nonpecuniary nature.16 9 It does not appear, however,
that Congress contemplated such a result under section 501 (b).171
The provision in section 501(b) allowing attorneys' fees is
identical to a provision proposed by Senator Ervin and later
adopted by the Senate as part of the Kennedy-Ives bill.' 7 '

Al-

though this bill was not passed by the House, the legislative history with respect to Senator Ervin's amendment is significant
inasmuch as this provision was included verbatim in the final
Senate 172 and House 73 versions of the LMRDA. After introducing his amendment, Senator Ervin said that it allowed a
trial judge, "in the event of a recovery,. .. [to award] a reasonable portion of the recovery to be used to pay the fees of counsel
representing the member of the union who brought the suit
168. See, e.g., In re Morton's Estate, 74 N.J. Eq. 797, 70 A. 680
(Prerogative Ct. 1908) (trust); Bosch v. Meeker Co-op. Light & Power

Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960) (corporation).

See Note,

Shareholder Suits: Pecuniary Benefit Unnecessary for Counsel Fee
Award, 13 STAN. L. REV. 146 (1960).

169. See, e.g., Vaccaro v. Gentile, 138 N.Y.S.2d 872, 879 (Sup. Ct.

1955), wherein the court stated:
The plaintiffs, by bringing this action, have managed to alert
the Union to the fact that some of these trust funds have been
dealt with as if they were part of the Union's general funds.
They have, therefore, served a useful purpose ....
Unquestionably, counsel for the plaintiffs should receive some compensation for their services. This should be paid from the
general funds of the Union since the Union and its members
will be the beneficiaries of this work.
Accord, Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18 App. Div. 2d 331, 239 N.Y.S.2d 792
(1963); Murray v. Kelly, 14 App. Div. 2d 528, 217 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1961);

Grein v. Cavano, 61 Wash. 2d 498, 379 P.2d 209 (1963).

See Cutler v.

American Fed'n of Musicians, 231 F. Supp. 845, 849-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
aff'd per curiam, 366 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1966); Milone v. English, 306
F.2d 814, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

170. See Duker, Fiduciary Responibility of Union Officials, in

SYMPosium 519, 525. See generally Counsel Fees 443; Annot., 9 A.L.R.
3d 1045 (1966).
171. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 109(b) (1958).
172. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 209(b) (1959). See S. REP. No.
187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1959).
173. H.R. 8342 (Elliott bill), H.R. 8400 (Landrum bill), H.R. 8401
(Griffin bill), 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501(b) (1959).
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.... 74 Senator Javits analogized the provisions of the amendment to a shareholder's derivative suit: "The way in which
such a stockholder can get counsel is that the amount recovered
then becomes a fund out of which counsel may be paid .... Our

colleague provides exactly that in the amendment."' 75 These
comments clearly suggest that the awarding of counsel fees was
to be conditioned upon a monetary recovery. 7 6 The following
remarks of Senator Goldwater indicate that this conclusion is
equally applicable to section 501(b):
Both bills, however, condition the payment of costs of actions
under the fiduciary provisions by the defendant upon "recovery"
by the plaintiff. Since under the House bill the recovery of
misused funds is not the only relief which may be appropriate
under that provision, limitations on payments of costs of defense to instances in which there is a recovery may defeat one
of the purposes of the provision, namely, to facilitate member actions to enforce the duties and responsibilities imposed by
the bill. The use of the same language as in77other comparable provisions ... would avoid this problem.
Since there is no persuasive legislative history to the contrary,
the argument that there must be a fund out of which to pay
counsel fees assumes substantial credibility. Nevertheless, the
courts thus far have been unanimous in concluding that the
word "recovery" must be given an expansive interpretation so
as to allow the granting of counsel fees in all cases where the
union has been benefited, and not just in those cases where there

has been a monetary recovery.
In Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen 78 the plaintiffs sought
counsel fees and expenses after successfully obtaining an injunction against the use of union funds to pay the legal fees incurred
by certain union officers who were charged with looting the
174. 104 CONG. REc. 11,327 (1958), LEG. HisT. 948.
175. 104 CONG. REc. 11,328 (1958), LEG. HIST. 949.

See also 105

CONG. REc. 6529 (1959) (remarks of Senator Javits), LEG. HIST. 1028.
But see H. HENN, CoRPoRATioNs 599 (1961).

176. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the purpose of Senator Ervin's amendment was to allow any union member to
sue a union officer who unlawfully embezzled union funds to recover
such funds. See 104 CONG. REc. 11,327 (1958) (remarks of Senator
Ervin), LEG. HisT. 948; 105 CONG. REc. 5494 (1959) (remarks of Senator
Goldwater), LEG. HisT. 1003-04; 105 CONG. REc. 6527 (1959) (remarks of
Senator Javits), LEG. HIST. 1025.
177. 105 CONG. REC. 16,489 (1959), LEG. HIST. 1069. But see H.R.
REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1959): "The bill authorizes a
union member to bring an action against any official or agent who
violates his fiduciary obligations . .. and such member may recover
counsel fees and costs if he prevails."
178. 220 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1965).
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union's treasury. The court in granting the plaintiffs' motion
for counsel fees and costs said that Congress could not have intended the phrase "a reasonable part of the recovery" to apply
only to a monetary recovery. "[O]therwise," the court noted,
"what would be the inducement to the speedy prosecution of an
action? An attorney should not be penalized for seeking a
timely injunction under the Act in order to prevent large unlawful expenditures by the Union."' 7 To support its decision, the
court broadly construed the term "recovery":
Most important, "recovery" in the common meaning of the term
means more than money. It means anything of value, as when
one says he "recovered" his overcoat which was stolen. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d. Edition, says that a
"recovery" is a "Means of restoration, remedy, cure." Recovery,
therefore, must include the entire remedy effectuated and thus
encompasses the total benefit conferred upon the Union through
the efforts of counsel. 1so
The court held that the obtaining of the injunction was a "benefit in and of itself without regard to any specific monetary
amount."' 8 1' It failed to mention, however, any of the legislative
history discussed above.
The court in Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Ratner,1 82
also apparently ignoring the legislative history, held that the
phrase "a reasonable part of the recovery" was permissive in
nature and meant only that ". . . where a monetary recovery
has in fact been achieved, that fund may constitute a source from
which the trial judge 'may allot a reasonable part' for the payment of counsel fees and disbursements."' 8 3 In Gilbert v. Hoisting & Portable Engineers, Local 701,184 the Oregon Supreme
Court held that section 501 (b) was "merely supplemental to state
remedies," and that the court was "not bound by any limitation
which that section imposes upon the allowance of attorneys'
fees."''1 5 The court then proceeded to award attorneys' fees,
179. Id. at 737.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 738.
182. 335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Accord, Local 92, Iron Workers
v. Norris, 66 L.R.R.M. 2297 (5th Cir. 1967).
183. Id. at 697.
184. 237 Ore. 130, 384 P.2d 136 (19e3), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963
(1964).
185. Id. at 137, 384 P.2d at 139. Actions brought under § 501 in
state courts are removable to the appropriate federal district court.
Clinton v. Hueston, 308 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1962). See Summers, Preemption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 22
Omo ST. L.J. 119, 151-52 (1961). Consequently, in Gilbert it is puzzling
why the union did not remove the case to the federal district court
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noting that "the fact that no money or property . . . [was] involved . . . [did] not detract from the importance of the litigation."18 6
While the result reached by the courts is desirable in terms
of public policy, it is difficult to reconcile it with the legislative
history and the literal working of section 501(b). Admittedly,
the Supreme Court in construing the LMRDA amendments to
section 8(b) (4) of the NLRA has dealt rather cavalierly with
the Act's legislative history, saying "that it ... [did] not reflect
with requisite clarity a congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites .... ,,"s8 Perhaps
the granting of counsel fees in cases where there has been no
monetary recovery can be rationalized on the ground that the
legislative history did not reflect with requisite clarity a congressional plan to proscribe such payments. Certainly such a
result would be in accord with the overall aims and purposes of

the LMRDA.
V.

SOME ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS

A. SCOPE OF SECTION 501's FIDUCIARY DuTIEs: ADMINISTRATION
OF UNION PENSION AND WELFARE PLANS

It is arguable that the fiduciary duties imposed upon union
officials by section 501 are not applicable to the administration
of union welfare and pension plans.18 8 This rather astounding
where § 501(b) would have been applicable. But see Summers, The
Impact of Landrum-Griffin in State Courts, 13 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNF. ON
LABOR 333, 352-54 (1960).
186. 237 Ore. at 138, 384 P.2d at 140. Subsequently, the court held
that the plaintiff union members were also entitled to attorneys' fees for
services rendered on appeal. Gilbert v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs,
Local 701, 237 Ore. 130, 139, 390 P.2d 320, 325 (1964).
187. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 48,
63 (1964).
188. See 64 LAB. REL. REP. 324-26 (1967) (speech by Ralph C. James
before New York University's annual conference on labor). See generally Collins, Some Additional Comments on the Fiduciary and Bonding Provisions of the LMRDA, 14 N.Y.U. ANN. CON'. ON LABOR 149,
150-53 (1961); Dugan, supra note 160, at 292-94; Note, Conflict of Interest Problems Arising From Union Pension Fund Loans, 67 COLum.
L. REV. 162, 170-72 (1967). See also Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304
(2d Cir. 1967) (applicability of § 501 to trust funds discussed but not
decided); Holton v. McFarland, 215 F. Supp. 372 (D. Alas. 1963) (allegation claiming breach of fiduciary duty in jeopardizing tax-exempt
status of fund dismissed because unsupported by facts and too vague).
Recently the Department of Labor's Advisory Council on Employee
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans recommended the enactment of a
federal law establishing fiduciary responsibility in the administration of
welfare and pension plans. 64 LAB. REL. REP. 165 (1967).
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proposition finds support in both the legislative history and in
a difference in the wording of sections 501(a) and 502(a). In
addition, it may be argued that because of the enactment of the
Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act' s9 which
deals specifically with this subject, section 501 no longer applies
to such funds. None of these arguments, however, is supportable.
The fiduciary provision proposed by Senator McClellan and
adopted by the Senate as part of the Kennedy-Ervin bill provided
that union officials not only had fiduciary responsibilities "to any
such labor organization and the members thereof," but also to
any "trust in which such organization is interested." 90 Senator
McClellan said that this provision covered "both pension and
welfare funds."'19 On the other hand, the fiduciary provision
which was finally enacted into law :provides that union officials
shall "occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization
and its members as a group." It does not state that there is a
fiduciary obligation to any "trust in which such organization is
interested." The argument can thus be made that the failure to
include the latter phrase indicates an intent on the part of Congress to exclude welfare and pension funds from any protection
under section 501. This argument is augmented by the fact that
the phrase "trust in which such organization is interested" was
included in section 502(a) which prescribes certain bonding requirements. This argument, however, assumes too much.
First, the term "money and property" as used in section 501
is broad enough to include trusts in which unions are interested.192 Second, the difference in terminology between sections
501(a) and 502(a) can be logically explained and justified when
examined from a drafting viewpoint. One commentator has
analyzed the difference as follows:
[T]he former [i.e., § 501(a)] recognizes the fiduciary obligations of union personnel only; the latter [i.e., § 502(a)] requires bonding for the handling of funds by both union personnel and all personnel of trusts in which unions are interested. It would not be possible to express the bonding requirement for all trust personnel, who may or may not represent or
be selected by unions, without mentioning trusts separately in
the legislation.193
Third, there is no legislative history, other than the difference in wording, which in any way indicates that Congress in189. 72 Stat. 997 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1964).
190. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 610 (1959).
191. 105 CONG. REC. 6527 (1959), LFc. H s. 1133.
192. See Collins, supra note 188, at :151.
193. Id. at 152.
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tended to exclude the administration of welfare and pension
plans from section 501(a)'s fiduciary obligation provision. On
the contrary, the legislative history strongly indicates that section 501, as finally enacted, does cover welfare and pension funds.
The Chairman of the House Labor Committee, Representative
Barden, in his analysis of section 501, made the following observation:
The McClellan committee recommendations on regulation and
control of union funds specifically stated that:
Since union dues moneys, as well as health and welfare
funds, are in actuality a trust, being held for the members of
the union by their officers, the committee feels that attention
should be given to placing certain restrictions on the use of
these funds, such as are now imposed on banks and other institutions which act as repositories and administrators for
trust funds.
This type of legislation, in the committee's opinion, would
go a long way toward preventing wholesale misappropriation
and misuse of union funds such as that disclosed by committee testimony.
Section 501 is intended to meet the needs, purposes, and
objectives set forth in the McClellan committee recommendations which I have just quoted. The language 194
of section 501
clearly and unmistakably carries out that intent.
Senator Goldwater made practically the same observation. 195
Aside from the legislative history, it may be argued that
Congress by enacting the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act has dealt specifically with the subject and that
section 501 of the LMRDA does not, therefore, apply to welfare
and pension funds. But section 16(b) of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act expressly provides that the requirements of the Act
shall not be held to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present
or future law of the United States or of any State affecting the
operation or administration of employee welfare or pension
benefit plans....

196

This provision clearly indicates that the Welfare and Pension
197
Plans Disclosure Act was not intended to be exclusive.
194.

105 CONG. REc. A8062 (1959), LEG. HIST. 1812 (emphasis added).

195. 105 CoNG. REc. 17,903-04 (1959), LEG. HIST. 1076. See Tarbutton, The Fiduciary Responsibility of Officers of Labor Organizations
Under the Common Law and LMRDA, in Sylv, osium 513 (1961),
wherein the author suggests that the large amount of money in union
welfare and pension plans was one of the principal reasons why Congress enacted § 501. Similar comment appears in REGULATING UNION
GOVERNMENT 217.
196. 72 Stat. 1002 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1964)
(emphasis added).

197. See Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Union Officers Under the
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B. Tim EFFECT OF SECTION 501's FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS UPON
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Numerous commentators have noted that the fiduciary provisions contained in section 501 (a) may be applicable to the collective bargaining process. 19 8 Professor Wollett, for instance, observed that the words of section 501 (a) "contain the seeds for
doctrinal growth which may have an impact reaching beyond
fiscal affairs of unions and touching the collective bargaining
process."'199 Since there has been no final resolution of this
problem, it is felt in some quarters that union officers will be inhibited in carrying out their collective bargaining responsibilities
by a fear of violating section 501.200 Whether this is true is, of
course, open to conjecture. Nevertheless, this problem is of vital
importance and any ambiguities should be set to rest as soon as
possible.
Section 501(a) specifically requires union officials "to refrain from dealing with such organization [their union] as an
adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties." The fiduciary duties imposed by section
501 (a) should thus be fully applicable with respect to any secret
profits or other personal benefits received by a union official as a
result of his collective bargaining activities. That this was the
intention of Congress seems clear from the comments of Representative Elliott, one of the principal sponsors of Title V:
...In collective bargaining, and in conducting other business,
union officers must put their fiduciary obligations ahead of their
personal interests.
The failure to recognize this faniliar principle lies at the
bottom of most of the wrongdoing uncovered by the Senate
select committee. A man cannot faithfully serve two masters.
The committee bill ... provides an effective remedy by
which individual union members may recover . . . any secret
LMRDA: A Guide to the Interpretation of Section 501, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
486, 506 n.125 (1962).
198. See, e.g., R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBrmAUON PROCESS 110-112
(1965); Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary
Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HAs-wGs L.J. 391, 429-30 (1964); Rosen, The Individual
Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem,
24 AM. L. REv. 233, 284-85 (1964).
199. Wollett, FiduciaryProblems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13 N.Y.U.
ANN.CoNF.ON LABOR 267 (1960).
200. See Previant, A Union Commentary on the Impact on Collective Bargaining of Titles I through VI of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 16
N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR, 157, 166-68 (1963).
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profit which he has acquired through any abuse of his fiduciary
position.201
Not surprisingly, one court has held that a complaint alleging
that certain union officials had "entered into 'sweetheart' contracts with employers .".,202 stated a cause of action.
On the other hand, the applicability of section 501 (a) is not
quite so clear when the question concerns the allowable discretion of a union official in negotiating or administering a collective
bargaining agreement. 20 3 Suppose that a union officer improvidently called a costly strike. Would a union member have a
valid cause of action under section 501 to recover the costs incurred by the strike?20 4 Assuming arguendo that a union official
has a fiduciary duty with respect to the calling of the strike, that
duty is certainly quite different from the duty he would have
with respect to the ordinary handling of union funds. In the
105 CONG. REc. 15,549 (1959), LEG. lIST. 1060.
202. Schonfeld v. Rarback, 61 L.R.R.M. 2043 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See
notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
A "sweetheart" contract is a collective bargaining agreement entered into as a result of collusion between an employer and a union.
203. Both the courts and the National Labor Relations Board have
imposed a duty of fair representation upon unions with respect to the
negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150
It has been
N.L.R.B. 312, enforcement granted, 368 F.2d 12 (1966).
suggested that there is an overlap between § 501 and the judicially
imposed duty of fair representation. See Fleming, supra note 198; Rosen,
supra note 198.
While the fair representation doctrine is closely related to the
fiduciary concept embodied in § 501, that section should not be construed to extend to situations in which the fair representation doctrine
is applicable. In this regard, it should be noted that a suit for breach
of a union's duty of fair representation is directed against the union,
whereas a suit under § 501 is brought against designated union officials.
In the former situation the individual or group of individuals suing
are seeking relief on their own behalf; in the latter situation the persons
suing are seeking relief on behalf of the union. There may be factual
situations, however, which give rise to both a suit for breach of a
union's duty of fair representation and for breach of the fiduciary duties
imposed by § 501. For example, if a union official arbitrarily refused
to process the grievance of a discharged employee and in return received some monetary benefit from the employee's employer, the employee should be able not only to sue the union on his own behalf for
breach of its duty of fair representation, but also to institute suit on
behalf of the union to recover the benefit received by the union
official.
204. See Wollett, supra note 199, at 282-83; Previant, Have Titles
I-VI of Landrum-Griffin Served the Stated Legislative Purpose?, 14
LAB. L.J. 28, 36 (1963).
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latter situation the official's duty would be analogous to that of
a trustee, that is, he would have an affirmative duty to exercise
reasonable care in the management and preservation of any funds
entrusted to him. 20 5 The analogy to the duties of a trustee
breaks down in the strike situation, however. There a union official should not be held to any higher standard of conduct than a
200
corporate officer is held to in the making of business decisions.
A union official "should not be liable for honest errors of judgment or even decisions which may reasonably be thought to be
imprudent.120 7 There remains a serious doubt as to section 501's
applicability at all in the example given.
In Echols v. Cook 208 the Teamsters Union agreed with an
employer who transported new cars that new competition from
railroad piggy-backing necessitated a lowering of transportation
costs. As a result, the union agreed to a three and one-half per
cent cut in mileage pay. Although this cut received majority
approval at a union meeting, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant officers violated section 501 by conspiring against them
and in favor of the employer. The plaintiffs sought, inter alia,an
injunction barring the defendant officers from purporting to act
as their collective bargaining representatives. The court denied
the requested injunction, stating:
What the plaintiffs ... request this Court to do is to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the duly elected collective bargaining representatives of the plaintiffs. Even if it
were to be admitted that the action of the Union here was
unwise, this is not an issue for determination by the Court.
For this Court to seek to determine whether or not the decision
made in this matter was wise would be for the Court to make
itself the collective bargaining representative. It would also
put the Court in the position of a compulsory arbitrator, whereas the parties have never agreed that the Court could so act.2 09
The court noted that the exclusive procedures of the NLRB were
available if a change in collective bargaining representatives was
sought.
The court in Echols reached the correct result. The legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend section 501 to
be generally applicable in the collective bargaining context,2 10
205. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusrs § 174 (1957).
206. See N. LATTm,THE LAW OF COaROATIONs 241-50 (1959).

207. Wollett, supra note 199, at 282. See Yanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d
197 (2d Cir. 1967) (allegation that union violated § 501 by inducing employees to strike dismissed).
208. 56 L.R.R.M. 3030 (N.D. Ga. 1962'.
209. Id. at 3032.
210. With respect to § 501's fiduciary provisions, John L. Holcombe,
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except where a union official has directly or indirectly received
some benefit or favor because of his collective bargaining activities on behalf of the union. The relevant Senate report declared
that "in establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care
should be taken not to undermine union self-government or
211
weaken unions in their role as collective bargaining agents."
In this regard, the courts would be well advised in construing
section 501(a) to take into consideration the following statement
made by the Independent Study Group sponsored by the Committee for Economic Development:
The guarantees contained in the law [LMRDA] are designed to
improve and not to impede the effective functioning of trade
unions and collective bargaining. The agencies and men administering these regulatory provisions can help by carrying out
their tasks in a manner calculated not to interfere with the
conduct of normal union business. It is important that this law
not be used as a device to harass union leaders. Such a result
would be doubly unfortunate, since it would play havoc with
orderly relations within the union and in collective bargaining
and it 212
would tend to discourage good men from seeking union
office.
Accordingly, to expand the scope of section 501 to permit judicial
scrutiny of the discretion allowable to union officials in collective
negotiations would not only be unwise, but would also be contrary to the intent of Congress.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The imposition of fiduciary duties upon union officials represents an important landmark in federal labor legislation. As one
writer has noted, "[t]hey represent the judgment of Congress,
which almost certainly will never be reversed, as to the minimum
ethical and legal standards by which the behavior of union
leaders must be measured. ' 21 8 It is unfortunate, however, that
Congress in enacting such an important provision used language
which is open to so many varying interpretations. Although the
former Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor-Management Reports, declared: "It is difficult to see how these can have any effect on collective bargaining." Holcombe, Government Regulation of Labor Unions
and the Impact on Collective Bargaining, 16 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNp. ON
LABOR

121, 124 (1963).

211. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959) (emphasis added).
212. INDEPENDENT STuDY GROUP, Tmn PuBLic INTEREST IN NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY 148-49 (Comm. for Economic Development, 1961) (emphasis added).
213. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REv. 851, 894 (1960).
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process of "litigating elucidation 21" has resolved some of the
uncertainties, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly have to resolve others, especially with respect to the breadth of the fiduciary duties imposed upon union officials.

214.
(1958).

International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619

